raptrbreth
Sharpshooter
Eighth Circuit: Citizens do not have a right to film public officials in public | KRCG
Hmm, wonder if this will stand?
Hmm, wonder if this will stand?
Read more like a ruling on who was more qualified to judge the case.
Before I even look at it, I'm going to bet "no, no they didn't".
http://media.ca8.uscourts.gov/opndir/17/07/163555P.pdf
Ok, help me find " you're not allowed to film public officials"
Or even where the right to film public officials is even discussed. It's about recusal of a judge.
Thanks for the Cliff's notes version.Wait.
Not so fast.
The appellate court "summarily" affirmed the grant of motions to dismiss and summary judgment. I'm not sure I've ever seen that before. And this is a final appeal (apparently). The panel totally dodged the issues that actually resolved the case.
Now, from the statement of the issues, the REAL issue appears to be whether the PD can take down videos posted on their book of faces. Well. Yes. It is their book. They can do whatever they want.
Dude can film and put them on his own book.
Stopping someone from filming in the (public) lobby of a PD is a closer call, but it is their property. If they have a no filming rule, that's probably a reasonable time/place/manner restriction.
So, it really isn't clear WHAT the appeals court is saying, other than the recusal wasn't necessary.
Wait.
...
So, it really isn't clear WHAT the appeals court is saying, other than the recusal wasn't necessary.
Akins also argues that the district court erred by granting the motions to
dismiss and for summary judgment filed by the defendants and by denying his own
motion for partial summary judgment. After careful de novo review, see Letterman
v. Does, 789 F.3d 856, 858–59, 861 (8th Cir. 2015) (summary judgment standard);
Gomez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 676 F.3d 655, 660 (8th Cir. 2012) (motion to
dismiss standard), we conclude that the district court did not err in its thorough and
well reasoned opinions. Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
Wait.
Not so fast.
The appellate court "summarily" affirmed the grant of motions to dismiss and summary judgment. I'm not sure I've ever seen that before. And this is a final appeal (apparently). The panel totally dodged the issues that actually resolved the case.
Now, from the statement of the issues, the REAL issue appears to be whether the PD can take down videos posted on their book of faces. Well. Yes. It is their book. They can do whatever they want.
Dude can film and put them on his own book.
Stopping someone from filming in the (public) lobby of a PD is a closer call, but it is their property. If they have a no filming rule, that's probably a reasonable time/place/manner restriction.
So, it really isn't clear WHAT the appeals court is saying, other than the recusal wasn't necessary.
Let's hope not. But they do think they are gods
Dude, once again, you're wrong on so many levels there's no way to tell where to start. So I won't.No it's not their Police department nor their property it's the public's. The same as anything they record or write down it belongz to the people the same as any government employee while at work
It's public domain. Now behind the locked doors I'm willing to stretch and give that one
Akins also argues that he was retaliated against when he was stopped from filming a citizen in the Police Department lobby in 2011; his links to the Citizens for Justice page were removed from the Police Department's Facebook page in the summer of 2011; and he was excluded from a Police Department Media Training Day in October 2015. None of the individual Defendants participated in these incidents, and as discussed above, the City cannot be liable under § 1983 on a respondeat superior theory. Moreover, Akins points to no unconstitutional municipal policy or custom. Further, he has no constitutional right to videotape any public proceedings he wishes to. See Rice v. Kempker, 374 F.3d 675, 678 (8[SUP]th[/SUP] Cir. 2004) (“[N]either the public nor the media has a First Amendment right to videotape, photograph, or make audio recordings of government proceedings that are by law open to the public.”), and Wis. Interscholastic Ath. Ass'n v. Gannett Co., 658 F.3d 614, 627-628 (7[SUP]th[/SUP] Cir. 2011) (same). His links to the Police Department's Facebook page were treated the same as everyone else's and there is no constitutional right to unlimited posting. See TinleySparks, Inc. v. Vill. of Tinley Park, 2015 WL 2265451, *10 (N.D. Ill. May 11, 2015) (“Plaintiffs have not cited any case holding that they have a right to post messages that could be perceived as political in online forums intended to promote small business growth. Indeed, the cases support the opposite conclusion: that Defendants could, consistent with the First Amendment, prohibit political messages on the Downtown Tinley website and Facebook page to preserve their intended purpose as small business forums so long as they refrained from engaging in viewpoint discrimination.”) Finally, with respect to the media training event, Akins was not a member of the traditional media, nor does the record show he was an active nontraditional media member at the time. Space was limited. These were content-neutral reasons not to create an exception for Akins to attend the invitation-only event. The media does not enjoy a right of equal access or special First Amendment rights. See Snyder v. Ringgold, 133 F.3d 917 (4[SUP]th[/SUP] Cir. 1998).