Maybe someone in this group can help me understand this better.
I posted about this shooting on Thursday in a Facebook group. It’s sad all the way around. Nobody that was involved walked away unscathed. It’ll be with victims on both sides for life.
My problem with this WNDU story today though stems from another aspect following this event. It seems that the SJC Prosecutor needs a lesson in Indiana State Law. At the end of the written article from the WNDU website, the prosecutor said that there could be “civil action” against the one who was justified in the shooting.
You can read the article here:
Prosecutor explains decision to not press charges in shooting at South Bend gas station
www.wndu.com
The only problem with what the prosecutor said is, state law strictly prohibits any penalty whatsoever, criminal or civil, if the shooting is justified. In fact, the “good guy with a gun”, as some have called them, is even protected from having to pay for his own legal defense fees in any matter related to this justified shooting.
Why would the prosecutor say something so out of step with the laws of our state? Is it an intentional misrepresentation or an honest mistake?
I’ll post the statute from our state code too. It just seems odd he would say such a thing…..
Indiana Code Title 34. Civil Law and Procedure § 34-30-31-1
Current as of June 08, 2021 | Updated by FindLaw Staff
Sec. 1. (a) As used in this section, “forcible felony” means:
(1) any offense described under IC 35-31.5-2-138;
(2) residential entry (as defined under IC 35-43-2-1.5); or
(3) burglary (as defined under IC 35-43-2-1).
(b) The justified use of force described under IC 35-41-3-2 provides a complete immunity against any claim or action initiated by a person:
(1) who alleges to have been injured or damaged by any such use of force; and
(2) whose conduct justified the use of force.
(c) In no case shall any use of force justified under IC 35-41-3-2 give rise to any claim or action for damages or compensation against a person, employer, or estate of a person using such force by or on behalf of any person who:
(1) was attempting to commit or committing a forcible felony at the time such force was used; or
(2) was attempting to cause or causing unlawful serious bodily injury to any other person at the time such force was used.
This prohibition shall apply to any claim or action brought by the estate, personal representative, spouse, or family member of a person described in subdivision (1) or (2).
(d) If a defendant files a motion under Trial Rule 56 of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure and supports that motion with admissible evidence that establishes a prima facie basis for the application of the immunity described in subsection (b) or (c), the burden shall shift to the plaintiff to oppose the motion with admissible evidence directly contradicting the application of the immunity in order to establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
(e) In a civil case in which an immunity defense under subsection (b) or (c) is raised, the fact that a defendant was not prosecuted for a crime related to the defendant's use of force shall create a rebuttable presumption that the defendant's use of force was justified under IC 35-41-3-2 and the jury shall be instructed on this presumption if the case proceeds to trial. In a summary judgment proceeding described in subsection (d), the fact that a defendant was not prosecuted for a crime related to the defendant's use of force shall also create a prima facie basis for the application of the immunity described in subsection (b) or (c).
(f) In any action commenced after June 30, 2019, in which the defense described in subsection (c) is raised by a defendant, at the conclusion of the action the court shall award to the defendant or defendants, as applicable, any reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending the action if a defendant successfully moves for summary judgment on the basis of the defense set forth in subsection (c) or the trier of fact determines that the action was prohibited by subsection (c).
I posted about this shooting on Thursday in a Facebook group. It’s sad all the way around. Nobody that was involved walked away unscathed. It’ll be with victims on both sides for life.
My problem with this WNDU story today though stems from another aspect following this event. It seems that the SJC Prosecutor needs a lesson in Indiana State Law. At the end of the written article from the WNDU website, the prosecutor said that there could be “civil action” against the one who was justified in the shooting.
You can read the article here:
Prosecutor explains decision to not press charges in shooting at South Bend gas station
Prosecutor explains decision to not press charges in shooting at South Bend gas station
WNDU caught up with St. Joseph County Prosecutor Kenneth Cotter on Friday and got an explanation of Indiana law.
The only problem with what the prosecutor said is, state law strictly prohibits any penalty whatsoever, criminal or civil, if the shooting is justified. In fact, the “good guy with a gun”, as some have called them, is even protected from having to pay for his own legal defense fees in any matter related to this justified shooting.
Why would the prosecutor say something so out of step with the laws of our state? Is it an intentional misrepresentation or an honest mistake?
I’ll post the statute from our state code too. It just seems odd he would say such a thing…..
Indiana Code Title 34. Civil Law and Procedure § 34-30-31-1
Current as of June 08, 2021 | Updated by FindLaw Staff
Sec. 1. (a) As used in this section, “forcible felony” means:
(1) any offense described under IC 35-31.5-2-138;
(2) residential entry (as defined under IC 35-43-2-1.5); or
(3) burglary (as defined under IC 35-43-2-1).
(b) The justified use of force described under IC 35-41-3-2 provides a complete immunity against any claim or action initiated by a person:
(1) who alleges to have been injured or damaged by any such use of force; and
(2) whose conduct justified the use of force.
(c) In no case shall any use of force justified under IC 35-41-3-2 give rise to any claim or action for damages or compensation against a person, employer, or estate of a person using such force by or on behalf of any person who:
(1) was attempting to commit or committing a forcible felony at the time such force was used; or
(2) was attempting to cause or causing unlawful serious bodily injury to any other person at the time such force was used.
This prohibition shall apply to any claim or action brought by the estate, personal representative, spouse, or family member of a person described in subdivision (1) or (2).
(d) If a defendant files a motion under Trial Rule 56 of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure and supports that motion with admissible evidence that establishes a prima facie basis for the application of the immunity described in subsection (b) or (c), the burden shall shift to the plaintiff to oppose the motion with admissible evidence directly contradicting the application of the immunity in order to establish a genuine issue of material fact for trial.
(e) In a civil case in which an immunity defense under subsection (b) or (c) is raised, the fact that a defendant was not prosecuted for a crime related to the defendant's use of force shall create a rebuttable presumption that the defendant's use of force was justified under IC 35-41-3-2 and the jury shall be instructed on this presumption if the case proceeds to trial. In a summary judgment proceeding described in subsection (d), the fact that a defendant was not prosecuted for a crime related to the defendant's use of force shall also create a prima facie basis for the application of the immunity described in subsection (b) or (c).
(f) In any action commenced after June 30, 2019, in which the defense described in subsection (c) is raised by a defendant, at the conclusion of the action the court shall award to the defendant or defendants, as applicable, any reasonable attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending the action if a defendant successfully moves for summary judgment on the basis of the defense set forth in subsection (c) or the trier of fact determines that the action was prohibited by subsection (c).
