In the Federalist Papers (articles 66-68 IIRC) Alexander Hamilton directly addressed that and proposed what he called a "select militia". It was extremely similar to the National Guard, with troops recruited&promoted by the states, who would train regularly, and were subject to mobilization by the federal gov't in an emergency. Not much different from what Switzerland does.The problem with this is in today's world you cannot just call up the militia to fight a war. You need the equipment and the training to use it.
The Enlisted Corps is why the US Military is so successful at the tactical level. Unfortunately victory at the tactical level has the least to do with actually winning the war. Early in my USAF days when I was a Supply Troop I remember someone saying we were the people with high school diplomas that dumbed stuff down for people with Masters Degrees. Nothing could be more true.You're wasting your time.
If you find yourself in Paris, though, check out there Army Museum. It has a great section on how the French military went from being a premier force to a complete disaster to a premier force again. Equipment was partly the issue, but institutional knowledge and a professional NCO corps was paramount. It's not particularly hard to drill someone on some basic infantry tactics but learning to run the logistics that keeps a fighting force able to fight a conventional war. Then add in the extremely technical jobs on today's battlefield, how long does it take to train a Combat Controller?
So, yes, you can still fight. You end up limited to guerilla tactics, which only win wars if the other side gets tired of killing you and goes home. Anyone who wants to seize territory and doesn't care if they play nice will just steamroll you.
I've observed a lack of consistency in this regard during this and the last administration. We heard about how the last guy was considered dangerous, unpresidential by the brass, but crickets this time, when the guy actually IS dangerous. This leads me to believe the military leadership at the top is either as incompetent or as compromised as the current CiC.it would take pert'near 1000 years to change the overall culture in the tribal areas of the middle east.
Also note: If more "brass" stood up to the CiC, they would be fired. A) They don't want to be fired (no surprise - those pensions are amazing) and B ) If those dudes and dudettes are fired, then more sympathetic-to-this-admin will be elevated as replacements.
You can just say as political.I've observed a lack of consistency in this regard during this and the last administration. We heard about how the last guy was considered dangerous, unpresidential by the brass, but crickets this time, when the guy actually IS dangerous. This leads me to believe the military leadership at the top is either as incompetent or as compromised as the current CiC.
'B', definitely 'B'I've observed a lack of consistency in this regard during this and the last administration. We heard about how the last guy was considered dangerous, unpresidential by the brass, but crickets this time, when the guy actually IS dangerous. This leads me to believe the military leadership at the top is either as incompetent or as compromised as the current CiC.
Excellent post and article. I am convinced that, among many, many (many) other factors, the generals and senior officers who fought WWII (in addition to politicians from those ranks) had absolutely no stomach for "total war" after seeing what they saw. However, this does not mean they had no stomach for war. Every generation of leaders has been trained up in the shadow of "The Big One". This "small war" things grew from many influences, but the idea that big wars could be prevented with small wars is a tough notion to kick. I'm also not so sure it's accurate or even if there is some truth, that it accomplishes what they thought it would.No accountability? Did you serve? The problem is there's a frigging overload of accountability, often for things you have no control over and for things that are not the mission. There's a huge zero defect mentality, and it's even more prevalent for commissioned officers who want to get promoted. No, accountability isn't remotely the problem.
The problem is similar to one that faces modern policing. Mission creep. You must be up for all things that civilian leadership decides to task you with. You're a hammer, so you can drive nails. If you're a sledge hammer, framing hammer, chipping hammer, that's irrelevant. You are a hammer and people who either don't know (or don't care) that there is more than one kind of hammer *or who have no other tools* will use you for things you aren't really designed to be used for. So the sledge hammer drives finishing nails...and a hammer is a tool and people use tools to turn screws, so the sledgehammer must be able to turn screws as well, right?
Here's an interesting take:
The Distress Cycle of American Military Conflicts
Like me, perhaps you’ve been watching the news from Afghanistan wondering how we got to this point. This piece is absolutely not an analysis of our twenty-year conflict there as I am neither …angrystaffofficer.com
"
While the military has a plethora of missions – really, whatever the civil government tells it to do – it has one, single no-fail mission: do not lose a major conflict that would place the sovereignty of the U.S. in jeopardy. That’s the one war that it cannot lose, otherwise, well, you get the picture. Therefore, the vast majority of time, money, training, and modernization is directed towards this one single end. Whether it be the massive infantry divisions of 1918, the atomic-focused military of the 1950s, or the movement towards total-force/joint operations in the late 20th/early 21st century, this is the one thing that everyone in all branches of the U.S. military can agree on.
And yet, the nation still asks for small wars. Those don’t go away. And so the massive behemoth of the U.S. military, built for the big fight with the USSR or China or whatever international bogeyman looms large at that moment, swings away in places like Vietnam, Panama, Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, or Afghanistan, to name a few. And while there are some concessions made to this kind of war – the expansion of the role of special operations forces during Vietnam, for example – by and large, the military’s force structure and overarching doctrine did not and have not changed from that geared towards the near-peer or peer competitor. To do so, would be to reduce readiness for that no-fail mission."
(more at link)
Excellent post and article. I am convinced that, among many, many (many) other factors, the generals and senior officers who fought WWII (in addition to politicians from those ranks) had absolutely no stomach for "total war" after seeing what they saw. However, this does not mean they had no stomach for war. Every generation of leaders has been trained up in the shadow of "The Big One". This "small war" things grew from many influences, but the idea that big wars could be prevented with small wars is a tough notion to kick. I'm also not so sure it's accurate or even if there is some truth, that it accomplishes what they thought it would.
And to that I say we let them do what they want to do. Both the people that live in those places and those they choose to lead them, or those that they allow to lead them. Either way, ultimately the choice lies with the citizens of those places, and no amount of outside influence is going to change that.It's hardly an original thought, but many say that assuming that a majority of people in every country would like some level of societal freedom and representative government rather than the elimination of people who don't believe all the same things as they do was foolhardy.
But maybe that really is something the majority want, but they are too afraid of "strong men" who don't want freedom and are willing to do tremendous violence...and having seen thousands of years of "strong man" rule rather than freedom...and then those who claimed they would set it straight cut and run....
Damned if I know.